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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the relative importance and mutual behavior of two competing
base-load electricity generation options that each are capable of contributing
significantly to the abatement of global CO2 emissions: nuclear energy and coal-based
power production complemented with CO2 capture and storage (CCS). We also
investigate how, in scenarios from an integrated assessment model that simulates the
economics of a climate-constrained world, the prospects for nuclear energy would
change if exogenous limitations on the spread of nuclear technology were relaxed. Using
the climate change economics model WITCH we find that until 2050 the resulting growth
rates of nuclear electricity generation capacity become comparable to historical rates
observed during the 1980s. Given that nuclear energy continues to face serious
challenges and contention, we inspect how extensive the improvements of coal-based
power equipped with CCS technology would need to be if our model is to significantly
scale down the construction of new nuclear power plants.
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1. Introduction
The development of nuclear power has experienced significant hindrance from concerns
over three main categories of issues that are intrinsically related to its use: reactor
accidents, radioactive waste and nuclear proliferation. Arguments regarding economic
competition and public opinion, and more recently terrorist activity, add to the obstacles
faced by the civil use of nuclear energy for electricity generation. These fundamental
drawbacks of nuclear energy have been the principal cause for this power production
option not to have expanded as widely as predicted decades ago by many energy
specialists, while when launched in the 1960s it was portrayed as a promising energy
alternative and foreseen by some to potentially fulfill much of mankind’s future energy
needs. Nonetheless, in recent years the debate over the role of nuclear power has revived,
particularly as a result of high fuel prices and the threats emanating from global climate
change. Even after the recent financial crisis, we are likely to see an increase in the
construction of nuclear power plants world-wide over the years to come. Before the start
of this crisis in the fall of 2008, China, India, South Korea, Japan and Ukraine were
reported to have planned a total nuclear capacity increase of even some 100 GW by 2020
(IEA, 2008).
During the past decade climate change has gained broad public attention and is
today appearing high on most countries’ political agendas. Policymakers, notably those
involved in negotiating a post-2012 climate agreement, rely increasingly on quantitative
estimates of the implications of climate change. Similarly, they need to be informed more
and more quantitatively about the possible implications of climate policies on global
technology diffusion and economic development. The economic analysis of climate
policy has therefore become a fertile and rapidly growing research area. It forms the basis
of the surveys carried out by Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC). In this research energy-environment-economy (EEE) models
occupy a leading role, since they generate figures on the technological, climatic and
economic variables at stake. Determining the values of these variables and their mutual
interference requires the large-scale integrated assessment approach offered by EEE
models.
Various modeling techniques are employed to prevent a restricted number of
technologies from either dominating the entire mitigation portfolio or hardly contributing
to it at all. Usually these techniques involve means of slightly changing input
assumptions, a practice known colloquially as “penny switching”. For example,
constraints on technology penetration rates or the use of supply cost curves are frequently
an essential element of EEE models. Given the distinctive nature of nuclear power,
however, the use of non techno-economic assumptions to capture its drawbacks warrants
particular attention. The uncertainties governing quantitative estimates of the costs
associated with waste management and nuclear proliferation are such that ex-ante
hypotheses on the attractiveness of nuclear power are often based on the modelers’
perception rather than on un-ambivalent objective analysis. This approach can be
questioned for at least three reasons.
First, adding constraints to optimization models results in economic penalties that
depend on the extent to which the space of feasible solutions is reduced. The tendency of
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nuclear power to dominate over alternative technologies, even when carbon dioxide is
priced at relatively low levels, suggests that ad hoc restrictions on this specific
technology might have a significant bearing on the economic costs of climate protection.
Second, imposing growth constraints on particular technologies in order to avoid an
outcome that ones judges unlikely or unacceptable may be considered at odds with the
underlying methodology of economic optimization. However reasonable it may be to
remain reserved about the prospects of any given technology, as with nuclear energy in
our case, the imposition of an external constraint on the speed with which this technology
can be deployed can also be inconsistent with historical records. This practice often
renders the calculated scenarios subjective. Third, while the approaches of cost
minimization, profit maximization or welfare optimization all have solid foundations in
economic theory and comply with standard empirically observed phenomena, there is
often little economic rationale for the existence of a central agent or socially optimizing
institution, especially at the global level, that in our case would be in the position to
impose a universal restriction (or stimulus) on the expansion of a certain energy
technology. At best, one could argue that through international agreements, social
processes and public organizations the nature of deployable technologies could be
requested to satisfy certain minimum (preferably enforceable) quality, safety,
environmental or usability qualifications.
The contribution of nuclear power to the mitigation effort required for global
climate stabilization varies appreciably across different studies, and depends in particular
on the type of climate policy architecture expected to be implemented in the near future
(Weisser et al., 2008). In some cases, nuclear power plays a negligible role in carbon
mitigation scenarios. For example, in a recent modeling comparison exercise (Clarke et
al. (2007), the MIT Integrated Global System Model stabilization scenarios report a use
of nuclear energy not much different from the no-climate-policy case and limited at
roughly today’s values. The ex-ante hypothesis of the authors is that for security reasons
nuclear power ought to be constrained in the portfolio of mitigation options. Their
assumption is probably legitimate – indeed, for these reasons nuclear power is currently
not eligible for emissions avoidance under the Kyoto Protocol – but we argue that the
audience reading and interpreting such modeling results should be informed about the
economic and technological consequences that stem from such an assumption.2
Unfortunately, economic climate modeling reports often lack transparency in this
respect. In comprehensive studies such as produced by Working Group III of the IPCC in
its most recent Fourth Assessment Report, nuclear power is found to play some
mitigation role, but significantly less than other technologies such as CO2 capture and
storage (CCS) or renewables (see figure SPM 9 in IPCC, 2007). Little insight is provided
in how this result is related to modeling assumptions such as regarding the nuclear
penetration rate.
This article is meant to shed light on this issue. We use the WITCH model to
investigate how in a climate-constrained world the prospects for nuclear energy would
change if imposed restrictions on technological growth are relaxed (Bosetti et al., 2006).
Given that nuclear energy continues to remain unpopular in many countries, largely for
reasons related to its inalienable risks, we also evaluate the improvements of its main
2

More recently, some modeling assumptions in the MIT scenarios were revised and nuclear power is now
projected to increase more rapidly than in the previous study (see Paltsev et al., 2009).
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base-load electricity production competitor – coal-fired power plants complemented with
CCS technology – needed to significantly scale down the prospects for nuclear power on
purely (non-constrained) economic grounds. Bosetti et al. (2009) evaluate the optimal
portfolio of investments in energy technologies and energy R&D from an economic
viewpoint, for a range of stabilization scenarios. This paper extends their work by
explicitly focusing on the role of nuclear electricity vis-à-vis other non-carbon power
generation technologies.
Despite a rapidly growing body of literature that investigates a broad scope of
climate mitigation options, little energy system or general equilibrium analysis has
concentrated on the specific role of nuclear power in global climate stabilization
scenarios. Chakravorty et al. (2005) provide a partial equilibrium analysis that accounts
for the exhaustibility of uranium ore reserves. A refined back-of-the-envelope calculation
of the possible contribution of nuclear energy to mitigating global climate change is
found in van der Zwaan (2002). Rogner et al. (2008) calculate country-dependent
levelized life-cycle electricity costs for nuclear energy. Vaillancourt et al. (2008) use the
detailed energy system model TIMES to explore a range of nuclear deployment
scenarios, under various sets of assumptions on technology parameters and exogenous
constraints on nuclear development to reflect for instance social perceptions. The analysis
presented in this paper is a further contribution to this under-explored subject. In
attempting to overcome the aforementioned modeling issues, we use historical references
to benchmark nuclear deployment in a carbon constrained world, with a minimum
reliance on ex-ante hypotheses. We also provide a specific comparison of nuclear energy
with its most competitive base-load low-carbon power generation alternative.
In section 2 we describe the main features of the climate change integrated
assessment model WITCH that we use for our analysis. Section 3 presents our scenario
results, based on tests with regard to the slackening of diffusion limitations for new
nuclear electricity generation capacity. Section 4 reports the techno-economic
advancements for a technology like CCS needed to downsize the deployment of nuclear
energy on competitive grounds. Section 5 presents a discussion of our findings and draws
our main conclusions.
2. The WITCH model
The World Induced Technical Change Hybrid (WITCH) model, developed by the climate
change team at FEEM, has been widely used for the investigation of several climaterelated research subjects.3 It belongs to the collection of integrated assessment models
dedicated to enhancing our understanding of the economic implications of climate change
mitigation policies and determining economically efficient strategies to achieve climate
control targets. With respect to other models of a similar kind – now widely used for the
numerical analysis of energy-climate-economy interactions, notably as part of ongoing
work for the IPCC – WITCH has a series of features that place it in a position to capture
additional aspects of the climate change conundrum.
WITCH has a neo-classical optimal growth structure, so that the long-term nature
of climate change is accounted for via inter-temporal optimization of far-sighted
economic agents who can incorporate future effects into current decision making.
3

For more details see e.g. Bosetti et al. (2006) and the model’s website at http://www.feem-web.it/witch.
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Strategies calculated by the solution of model runs are thus efficient over long periods of
time, an important characteristic given that CO2 has an atmospheric lifetime of hundreds
of years and investments in the energy sector usually generate lock-ins that last for
decades.4 As a result, today’s decisions lead to future responses and are important
determinants of how the future looks like, the climatic and economic dynamics of which
are modeled in WITCH. The simulation of the energy sector, the largest source of
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, is fully integrated in the aggregate production
function, a ‘hard link’ that ensures consistency of economic output with investments in
conventional or innovative energy carriers and electricity production facilities. The power
sector consists of seven options capable of generating electricity: traditional coal (i.e.
pulverized coal, PC, without CCS), advanced coal (an integrated gasification combined
cycle, IGCC, with CCS), oil, natural gas, hydropower, nuclear energy, renewables (in our
case a combination of wind and solar energy).
WITCH possesses a game-theoretical set-up that allows mimicking the free-riding
incentives that the 12 regions constituting the world are confronted with as a result of the
consumption of public ‘goods’ and production of public ‘bads’. Global externalities due
to the emissions of CO2 (reflected by a damage function and a global atmosphere-climate
module), extraction limits of exhaustible resources such as fossil fuels, and a limited
appropriability of knowledge behind innovation, are also taken into account, so that
regions choose their investment paths strategically with respect to the choices of other
regions. The result is a hybrid model that provides quantitative insight in the design of
climate protection policies and informs policymakers regarding the economically
efficient set of strategies fit to address global climate change, while it simultaneously
deals with a set of inter-related environmental and economic (in)efficiencies.
Given that the focus of this paper is on the power sector (and given our
assumption that hydropower is little expandable on a global basis), the three most
prominent essentially carbon-free technologies are coal-based power plants equipped
with CCS, nuclear power plants, and electricity generation based on renewables (that
consist of a bundle of wind and solar energy). Table 1 provides our main technoeconomic assumptions for these technologies. Nuclear energy and IGCC plants
complemented with CCS technology are described by rather similar parameter values in
some respects: relatively high investment costs and a high utilization factor as typical for
base-load electricity production. Coal reserves are assumed to be abundant, with an
equilibrium price not exceeding 80$/t throughout the century in a business-as-usual
(BAU) coal-intensive scenario. Similarly, uranium is assumed to be sufficiently abundant
to satisfy a significant revival of the nuclear industry during the 21st century. Uranium
reserves are assumed to be large at prices below approximately 300$/kg, at which point
reprocessing spent fuel and fast breeder reactors become competitive (hence preventing
any further rise in the price of uranium and corresponding cost increase of nuclear
energy; see Bunn et al., 2005). In order to be used as fissile material, uranium ore must
undergo a process of conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication; we have set the
corresponding cost at 250$/kg (MIT, 2003). Nuclear waste storage and management fees
are assumed to increase linearly with the quantity of spent fuel produced and are set at
0.1 ¢/kWh (MIT, 2003). For CCS, CO2 transport and storage costs are accounted for via
4

The half time of atmospheric CO2 is roughly 100 years, and the lifetime of a power plant can surpass half
a century.
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regional supply curves calibrated on data available in the literature (Hendriks et al.,
2004). The fraction of CO2 captured is supposed to be 90% and a zero CO2 leakage rate is
assumed. Wind and solar energy are characterized by relatively low investment costs, but
also by a low load or utilization factor. It is the only technology that we assume to be
subject to significant technological change through learning-by-doing: especially for
solar power plants it is expected that there is scope for further improvements in
competitiveness. We therefore assume that wind and solar power are subject to progress
in such a way that each doubling of cumulative installed capacity leads to an investment
cost reduction of 13%, a rather conservative value in comparison to learning rates
observed in practice, because we argue learning will not continue indefinitely (IEA,
2000; Ferioli and van der Zwaan, 2009).
Table 1. Techno-economic assumptions for the main electricity generation alternatives in
WITCH: coal + CCS, nuclear energy and renewables (wind and solar energy).

Investment Cost
($2005/kW)
Utilization Factor
Thermal Efficiency
CO2 Capture or
Avoidance Share
Learning Rate

Coal + CCS

Nuclear Energy

Wind + Solar

2500

2500

1900

85%

85%

25%

40% 5

35%

-

90%

100%

100%

-

-

13%

3. Scenario results
In addition to a BAU scenario, under median assumptions on population growth and
economic development and central values for a range of energy technology parameters
and their evolution over time, we model two policy scenarios, consistent with the
stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of CO2 at 450 and 550 ppm. The latter
roughly correspond to 550 and 650 ppm stabilization scenarios for all greenhouse gases
combined. These scenarios can each be compatible with a stabilization of the global
atmospheric temperature at 2.5 and 3 ºC increase, at a climate sensitivity of 3. Although
the IPCC suggests a considerably more stringent target of 2 ºC, both scenarios imply very
significant emission reductions. Global emissions are assumed to peak in 2015 for the
450 ppm case and in 2050 for the 550 ppm case, while cumulative mitigation throughout
the century would amount to over 1100 and 750 GtCO2 respectively. Because of the
convex marginal abatement cost curve in our model, the additional effort to achieve the

5

This value accounts for the energy penalty resulting from the CO2 capture process.
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most stringent target would come at a considerably higher price. The scenarios are run up
to 2150, but for our present purposes it suffices to report results until 2050 only.
While under these climate control scenarios the development of all power
generation options are affected, either negatively (as with the carbon-intensive options) or
positively (the carbon-poor alternatives), with respect to the BAU run, we inspect for our
purposes three (clusters of) technologies only: nuclear power, coal with CCS, and
renewables (wind and solar energy combined).
Figure 1 shows the simulation by WITCH of the 5-year averages of annual
capacity additions (excluding the replacement of ageing existing capacity) for nuclear
power until 2050 under each of the three scenarios. The values of the annual additions as
realized over the past two decades are also plotted, as well as the historic single-year
maximum attained during this time frame. We see that in the BAU scenario nuclear
power additions over the forthcoming decades reach a value of 10-15 GW/yr, while in
recent years this annual new capacity did not amount to more than a few GW/yr at most.
This result connects to the reality in especially several countries with rapid economic
growth, like (but not exclusively) China and India, that there is increased interest for this
power production option for reasons of competitive costs, energy security and air
pollution control. Figure 1 also shows that under a 550 ppm climate stabilization scenario
this new capacity deployment is significantly enhanced to a level of 15-20 GW/yr, and
reaches a value of over 35 GW/yr by the middle of the century under a 450 ppm scenario.
We also see that in the 550 ppm scenario, annual additions of nuclear capacity reach the
level as observed in the 1980s, while in the 450 ppm scenario they obtain after several
decades a value consistently similar to the one-year high of 1985. The explanation for
this rapid expansion of nuclear power is of course the fact that nuclear energy emits
essentially no CO2, and that the carbon price needed to achieve emission reductions
coherent with the indicated climate targets is substantial and grows fast. For example, in
the stringent 450 ppm scenario, the marginal cost of CO2 abatement exceeds 100$/tCO2
already in 2030 and grows markedly even after that. This growth in the value of CO2
abatement naturally provides a large incentive for the deployment of CO2-free
technologies for power generation, a sector characterized by marginal abatement costs
less steep than in other parts of the economy such as the transportation sector.
Total installed capacity for nuclear power in 2050 amounts to roughly 1150 and
1500 GW for the 550 and 450 ppm cases respectively. These numbers are somewhat
higher in comparison to estimates reported in the literature. For example, Vaillancourt et
al. (2008) determine a nuclear capacity of about 1000 GW in a 450 ppm scenario, and
slightly lower numbers for the 550 ppm and the BAU cases than ours. The International
Energy Agency (IEA, 2008), which analyzes scenarios with somewhat different climate
objectives, projects nuclear capacity in 2050 to lie in between 860 and 1150 GW.
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Nuclear power

new capacity (GW/yr)

50
40
30
20
10

single year
Historical
BAU

2050

2040

2030

2020

2010

2000

1990

1980

0

450ppm
550ppm

Figure 1. WITCH simulations of future capacity additions of nuclear power (in GW/yr) in
BAU, 450 and 550 ppm scenarios, as well as realized during 1985-2005. The “single
year” point shows the historic maximum realized.
Figure 2 shows the same results for the development of coal-based electricity
generation equipped with and without CCS technology (note the larger vertical scale).
CCS technology is obviously not economical without a price on CO2, as demonstrated by
the horizontal line for BAU, but experiences a widespread application for either a 450 or
550 ppm climate stabilization target. Under a 550 ppm scenario in less than two decades
as much as 30 GW/yr new coal power plants are equipped with complete CCS
technology until at least the middle of the century (and in fact much beyond). Typically
this level of annual additions equals the average number of coal-based power plants
(without CCS) built since the 1990s. Under a 450 ppm climate target the use of CCS
explodes, reaching a peak around 2020 of over 40 GW/yr. This exceedingly high level
(although still below the record level of non-CCS coal-based power plants taken in
operation in 2005) vanishes over time, however, given that the low but unequal to zero
CO2 emission rate of CCS (see Table 1) is penalized by the progressively stringent
climate obligations, for which totally carbon-free technologies are preferred.6
Nonetheless, for both climate policies the deployment of CCS is very significant, and
reaches a level as high as 550 GtCO2 of cumulative storage by the end of the century,
with a world average transport and storage cost by then of about 25 $/tCO2.

6

It should be noted that a higher CO2 capture rate or the use of CCS in conjunction with biomass would
allow CCS to remain competitive in a stringent climate scenario even beyond 2050.
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Coal power (with and without CCS)
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Figure 2. WITCH simulations of future capacity additions of coal-based power plus CCS
(in GW/yr) under BAU, 450 and 550 ppm scenarios, as well as realized without CCS
during 1985-2005. The “single year” point shows the historic maximum realized.
As extensively described in the literature, it is unlikely that one or a couple of
CO2 abatement options alone can address any reasonable level of climate control (IPCC,
2007). Indeed, Figure 3 confirms that renewables such as wind energy and solar power
are strong favorites for necessary additional mitigation options, notably in regions with
large wind and solar radiation potentials. Even under BAU conditions, wind and solar
power continue their surge, and easily more than double over the forthcoming decades
from the present value of about 5 GW/yr. When global climate policy is adhered to,
renewables grow much faster: their additions may even exponentially increase to values
over 30 GW/yr by 2050 in the case of a 450 ppm climate objective. Such stringent
climate policy would rapidly render renewables an energy option at a similar footing as
the traditional ones currently in use, as a result of their increased competitiveness
following policy-induced learning-by-doing effects. Renewables, however, are
characterized by relatively low initial deployment rates due to their high early investment
costs and low capacity factors, especially for solar energy.
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Wind+Solar Power
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Figure 3. WITCH simulations of future capacity additions of renewables (wind plus
solar, in GW/yr) under BAU, 450 and 550 ppm scenarios, and realized since 1995. The
“single year” point shows the historic maximum realized.
Our overall observation is that each of these three types of power technologies –
nuclear energy, coal plus CCS and renewables – is needed for serious climate change
control. In order to reach CO2 emission reduction targets that avoid increasing the
atmospheric CO2 concentration to more than 450 or 550 ppm, at least two of these three
options are needed at a globally very large scale, and probably all three. We also see that,
when the commonly applied growth constraints on nuclear power are relaxed, it is
expanded rapidly but with rates not exceeding much the levels experienced in the past.
Indeed, we find that the nuclear energy growth rates generated by WITCH are generally
consistent with those observed during the 1970s and 1980s, i.e. when nuclear power was
in its heydays and experienced a more favorable attitude than it did over the past two
decades. Similar results can be found in Bosetti et al. (2009).
4. Implications and alternatives
All scenarios depicted in Figure 1 foresee an expansion of the total capacity of nuclear
energy over the coming half-century. In the 450 ppm case, for example, the available
nuclear power in 2050 is increased by about a factor of three with respect to the currently
installed global capacity that amounts to about 370 GW. What does this imply for nuclear
energy? The simulated growth paths for nuclear energy respond, along with several other
non-carbon energy resources, to the challenge of mitigating global climate change while
simultaneously generating benefits in terms of air pollution reduction and energy security
enhancement. Another effect would be that such an expansion would spur innovation in
the nuclear industry and generate incentives to develop and deploy new reactors of
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generation III and eventually generation IV types that can profit from improvements with
respect to reactors presently in operation (see e.g. van der Zwaan, 2008). In economic
terms an expansion of the nuclear sector could also produce economies-of-scale with
corresponding cost reductions. Troublesome, however, is that an expansion of nuclear
power exacerbates the already serious concerns regarding its use at current levels, that is,
in terms of the ‘classical’ intricacies associated with this power generation option: reactor
accidents, radioactive waste and nuclear proliferation.
More reactors in operation world-wide enhance in principle the probability that
with one of them a serious incident or accident occurs, especially when considering that
an important share of the additions of nuclear capacity will probably take place in
countries with still limited reactor operation experience and yet to be perfected safety
standards. It has been pointed out, however, that while the chance for accidents remains
unequal to zero, the likelihood for such events has reduced significantly over the past
decades and should engender less concern today than it did in the 1980s (Sailor et al.,
2000). Also, both through more advanced reactor designs and improved operation
standards, risks for serious accidents are likely to continue to decrease in the future.
While radioactive waste production occurs at basically every stage of the nuclear
fuel cycle, in solid, liquid or gaseous state, spent fuel is most problematic, since it
generates heat during many years after de-loading from the reactor core and remains
highly radioactive for thousands of years. Radioactive contamination of the environment
from spent fuel storage can be minimized through several layers of physical containment,
probably at some stage including reversible geological deposition deep underground.
While progress on deep geological disposal has been made in e.g. Finland, France and
Sweden, many governments delay decisions on this subject and instead adopt strategies
of intermediate aboveground bunker or dry cask storage like in the Netherlands and the
US. The main issue concerning underground storage remains uncertainty about the
integrity of spent fuel canisters: it is questioned whether the isolation offered by
geological formations will be sufficient over a period of thousands of years. The fear is
that canisters, as a result of corrosion, will leak and consequently contaminate
groundwater in the far future. Several channels exist through which the problem could be
mitigated, in particular organizing the disposal of waste regionally through
Internationally Monitored Waste Repositories (IMWRs). As long as international
solutions for the storage of waste continue to be delayed, however, or other solutions are
not brought forward to tackle the intrinsic waste problematique of nuclear energy, its role
in future power supply remains handicapped and a possible expansion of nuclear energy
worldwide gives much reason for concern (van der Zwaan, 2002 and 2008).
Nuclear power generation inherently involves the risk that nuclear industry related
technologies and materials are diverted for non-civil purposes. Among nuclear energy’s
main proliferation threats are the use of enrichment facilities and the production of fissile
materials (see notably IPFM, 2007). Countries operating enrichment technologies or
organized terrorist groups possessing highly enriched uranium (HEU) may relatively
easily construct a basic fission explosive device and use it for military or terrorist
purposes. Several plutonium isotopes contained in reactor-grade spent fuel, accounting
for 1-2% of its volume, are fissile and can serve to fabricate a nuclear weapon. Especially
when spent fuel from the civil nuclear industry is reprocessed, this problem becomes
apparent: plutonium contained in spent fuel is reasonably safe against diversion for
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weapons use because of the highly radioactive waste materials in which it is embedded,
but its separation during reprocessing makes it vulnerable for direct military or terrorist
use, even while it is of lower quality than weapon-grade plutonium. The global control of
sensitive technologies, the monitoring of nuclear activities and safeguarding and deletion
of fissile materials, like HEU and plutonium, are central to the solution of nuclear
proliferation. In order to avoid fissile materials being diverted for non-civil purposes,
dedicated technical efforts and effective international institutions are required. Their
improvement is important irrespective of the future share of nuclear energy in total power
production, but will become more poignant when nuclear energy experiences a
renaissance.
Suppose that for the reasons just given one finds an expansion of nuclear energy
unacceptable, especially with annual additions over the coming 50 years that may run in
the 15-20 GW/yr, under a 550 ppm climate control scenario, and that may increase to
35 GW/yr in the 450 ppm scenario. What then would be the improvements that need to
materialize for other non-carbon options in order to let them dominate or scale down the
spread of nuclear power in the solution set of WITCH, that is, without the imposition of
ex-ante growth constraints? In other words, can one crowd out nuclear power off the
market by rendering other carbon-free electricity generation options economically more
attractive and thereby more competitive? What sort of improvements need to be
accomplished in order to avoid the widespread expansion of nuclear energy that many
reject for the above listed set of ‘classical’ arguments?
We address these questions by focusing on the combustion of coal for power
production complemented with CCS, since we believe it is becoming one of the most
direct competitors of nuclear power (much like nuclear energy and oil-based power were
main competitors in the 1970s and 1980s until the last was essentially phased out as a
result of broad deployment of the former; see Toth and Rogner, 2006). Indeed, coal-based
power generation plus CCS and nuclear energy are both base-load electricity production
options. We focus on three potential areas of improvement for CCS technology by
distinguishing three cases of assumptions:
•
•
•

the CO2 emission capture rate is raised from 90% to 99%, making
CCS an essentially zero-emission technology7;
CCS++: in addition, transport and storage costs do not exceed 12 $/tCO2, i.e.
the availability of suitable repositories is very large;
CCS+++: in addition, CCS investment costs gradually decrease until a 50%
reduction over the course of 20 years.
CCS+:

Figure 4 revises Figure 1 for the simulated nuclear energy expansion for these
three CCS-favorable cases under the 450 ppm scenario. We see that each of these three
cases generates a reduced reliance on nuclear power for climate control purposes. It can
also be observed, however, that even in the most optimistic case for CCS technology,
nuclear energy will still be needed at annual additions of about 20 GW/yr. This level thus
constitutes a bottom-line requirement threshold for nuclear power.

7

This could be either achieved by improving CO2 capture technology or by co-firing coal with biomass.
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Nuclear power: 450 ppm
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Figure 4. WITCH simulations of future capacity additions of nuclear energy (GW/yr) in
the 450 ppm scenario with various improvements for CCS technology.
Figure 5 shows our results for the 550 ppm scenario under the same three cases of
progress in the development of CCS technology. Like under the 450 ppm scenario, a
reduced reliance on nuclear power for climate management materializes, with the same
ranking between the three cases. Overall, however, the differences between the three
cases are less pronounced, the explanation for which is the less ambitious climate control
target. Under this scenario even in the most optimistic case for the amelioration of CCS,
nuclear energy will still be needed to a minimum level of annual additions of
approximately 15 GW/yr. In both Figures 4 and 5, the evolution of nuclear energy over
the coming half-century never drops below the BAU reference curve shown in Figure 1.

13
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

13

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 361 [2009]

Nuclear power: 550 ppm
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Figure 5. WITCH simulations of future capacity additions of nuclear energy (GW/yr) in
the 550 ppm scenario with various improvements for CCS technology.
What do these results imply for the amounts of consumed electricity, generated by
nuclear energy and coal based power with CCS via existing capacity plus the installed
additions depicted in the previous figures? Figure 6 summarizes, for the 450 and 550 ppm
scenarios respectively, the global electricity produced in 2050 for these two power
production alternatives. It also shows how these total levels change if the technological
advancements reported earlier are achieved for CCS.
Nuclear power contributes sizably more than coal plus CCS, by about 40%, only
under the 450 ppm scenario and when none of the potential CCS improvements are
attained, as shown by the histogram bars on the left in the left plot. Under optimistic
assumptions for CCS technological innovation, either in the 450 or 550 ppm scenario,
coal combustion plus CCS becomes significantly more important for power production
than nuclear energy, by a factor of about two in the ideal case that all CCS technology
improvements are effectively realized. If only the capture rate for CCS can be improved,
the level of electricity generated by these two options almost equalizes. Note that the total
electricity generated by nuclear and CCS together increases with the assumed
advancements of CCS, that is, nuclear energy is crowded out less than the increase in the
use of CCS as a result of the latter’s improvements.
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Figure 6. WITCH simulations of electricity generation (PWh) in 2050 by coal plus CCS
and nuclear power under the 450 ppm (left) and 550 ppm (right) scenarios.
5. Discussion and conclusions
Under a stringent climate control target in an otherwise unconstrained world for
economic growth, EEE models tend to be favorable for a widespread deployment of
nuclear energy in the power sector. Usually, analysts either consider a large expansion of
nuclear power unrealistic or for other reasons prefer to avoid their scenario runs to yield
an outcome concentrating considerably on nuclear energy. Consequently, specific
technology diffusion constraints are introduced to limit the expansion of nuclear power.
These boundary conditions, however, tend to have a significant impact on the economic
performance of climate policy.
The increasing necessity to achieve globally significant CO2 emission reductions,
imminently and at affordable costs, is beneficial for the prospects of nuclear energy.
Whether one favors an expansion of nuclear power or not, this energy supply option
essentially emits no CO2, or at least very low levels even when considering the entire
nuclear fuel cycle. The analysis presented in this paper shows that if in the EEE model
WITCH, and quite possibly in other numerical models designed for the integrated
assessment of climate change, no growth constraints are imposed on the deployability of
nuclear energy, this technology could well experience the renaissance that is predicted by
some analysts. We demonstrate that nuclear power can at most be part of the solution to
climate change and does not constitute a silver bullet. Hence, if at all, it needs to be
employed in conjunction with other CO2 mitigating energy options (as also described in
van der Zwaan, 2002). It could become a significant necessary part of the total solution,
however, if agreed climate targets are as stringent as 450-550 ppm CO2 stabilization
levels. In particular, we show that under these climate-constrained scenarios the
expansion rate of nuclear energy during the forthcoming 50 years does probably not need
to largely exceed the growth rates as experienced during the heydays of nuclear energy
deployment in the 1980s.
The analysis we performed cannot address or answer the question whether the
nuclear industry will be able to handle the capacity additions and corresponding capital
requirements as implied by our modeling runs. Our research does indicate, though, that
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the total investments necessary for a large-scale expansion of nuclear energy are feasible
from an aggregate perspective of economic production and growth. Bosetti et al. (2009)
found, also on the basis of analysis with WITCH, that the challenges associated with
global climate change suggest an imminent return to the energy R&D levels of the 1980s.
In this paper we expand on their conclusions by reporting that also in terms of annual
nuclear electricity capacity additions we may need to return to those that prevailed a
couple of decades ago, at least on the basis of scenario investigations with WITCH. Of
course, the predominant energy concern of the 1970s was different from that
preoccupying scientists and policy makers today: energy insecurity versus climate
change. We find that the possible response to these two different crises, however, may be
similar, at least in certain respects.
While the nuclear expansion rates calculated in this study could resolve
significant part of the climate change challenge, and would possess benefits in other
domains such as reducing air pollution and diminishing energy dependence in many
countries, from several perspectives an increase in the use of nuclear energy as simulated
in our work would be of serious concern, notably in terms of radioactive waste and
nuclear proliferation. We demonstrate that the requirements for technological and
economic improvement of CCS, which according to WITCH could significantly scale
down the expansion needs of nuclear energy, are not negligible. A better CO2 capture
rate, as well as reduced storage and investment costs, would allow CCS to overtake
nuclear energy as leading cost-efficient mitigation technology in the power sector.
The improvements needed for CCS arguably necessitates dedicated investments
in innovation, R&D and pilot and demonstration programs, which would require the
mobilization of substantial economic resources. Their quantification is difficult, but the
economic benefits resulting from such improvements can provide a reference threshold
below which it would be profitable to endorse them. Table 2 shows the cost savings
resulting from CCS improvements, calculated in terms of the net present value of global
welfare over the current century, at a 5% discount rate, and expressed as difference with
respect to the conventional CCS reference case. Our simulations indicate that
improvements in all three CCS areas identified in this paper can lead to substantial
savings, of over 5 trillion US$ for the most stringent climate policy, and more than
2 trillion US$ for the less ambitious one. Indeed, the benefits of CCS improvements also
depend on the climate objective. For the 450 ppm case, increasing the capture rate proves
to provide the highest overall cost reduction leverage. For the 550 ppm scenario, on the
other hand, lowering storage costs and capital investments prove instead the most
valuable strategy.
Table 2. Cost savings with respect to the CCS reference case (trillion US$).
CCS+

CCS++

CCS+++

550 ppm

0.19

1.38

2.23

450 ppm

2.77

4.23

5.12
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Even when one assumes that CCS is significantly improved, nuclear power would
still need to be expanded sizably, typically by some 15 GW/yr added capacity, in order to
reach stringent climate goals. These additions alone would justify higher investments that
allow improving nuclear technology and especially empowering institutions that control
its safe and secure international deployment. Still, progress in CCS technology could
reduce the expansion needs for nuclear energy and thus the extent of the classical
problems encountered with nuclear power. According to our cost minimization
framework a nuclear power renaissance of some sort cannot be avoided, so concerns
surrounding several aspects of nuclear energy ought to be solved in any case. We think
these concerns have to be adequately and acceptably addressed even if nuclear power
were to be phased out altogether, given that radioactive and fissile materials have been
produced abundantly since the advent of the nuclear era.
Surely the last word has not been said about nuclear energy, nor about climate
change. In this paper we bring forward some new findings at the cross-section of these
two subjects. Topics abound for further work. One aspect would be to address the
question what the extra costs incurred would be if one nevertheless imposed a growth
constraint on nuclear energy, in line with what so far has been common practice but that
we personally have reasoned objections against, in comparison to a scenario in which no
such constraint is applied. It would also be interesting to see what the effects are in our
modeling setting of the recent commodity price surges on the investment cost
requirements for CCS facilities and nuclear power plant construction. These and related
issues we plan to assess in the future.
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